It is this later resolution that I am supposing here. There is one obvious difference between the two formulae, Do good and avoid evil, and Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. That difference is the omission of pursuit from the one, the inclusion of it in the other. 2, c. (Summa theologiae will hereafter be referred to as S.T.). 3)Now among those things which fall within the grasp of everyone there is a certain order of precedence. 4, c. [27] See Lottin, op. [32] Moreover, Aquinas expressly identifies the principles of practical reason with the ends of the virtues preexisting in reason. Of course, if man can know that God will punish him if he does not act in approved ways, then it does follow that an effective threat can be deduced from the facts. There is nothing surprising about this conclusion so long as we understand law as intelligence ordering (directing) human action toward an end rather than as a superior ordering (commanding) a subjects performance. Nature is not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops and from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct strata. For Aquinas, right reason is reason judging in accordance with the whole of the natural law. The principles of practical reason belong to a logical category quite different from that of theoretical statements: precepts do not inform us of requirements; they express requirements as directions for action. The relation of man to such an end could be established only by a leap into the transrational where human action would be impossible and where faith would replace natural law rather than supplement it. An intelligibility need not correspond to any part or principle of the object of knowledge, yet an intelligibility is an aspect of the partly known and still further knowable object. 'An apple a day keeps the doctor away . 64, col. 1311. Practical reason, therefore, presupposes good. The invocation of a metaphysics of divine causality and providence at this point is no help, since such a metaphysics also consists exclusively of theoretical truths from which reason can derive no practical consequences. Because such principles are not equally applicable to all contents of experience, even though they can be falsified by none, we can at least imagine them not to be true. Mans lowliness is shown by the very weakness of reasons first principle; by itself this precept cannot guide action, and the instigation of natural inclination and the inspiration of faith are needed to develop an adequate law for human life. 1-2, q. It also is a mistake to suppose that the primary principle is equivalent to the precept. In neither aspect is the end fundamental. mentions that the issue of the second article had been posed by Albert the Great (cf. The seventh and last paragraph of Aquinass response is very rich and interesting, but the details of its content are outside the scope of this paper. None of the inclinations which ground specific precepts of the natural law, not even the precept that action should be reasonable, is a necessary condition for all human action. Aquinass solution to the question is that there are many precepts of the natural law, but that this multitude is not a disorganized aggregation but an orderly whole. In forming this first precept practical reason performs its most basic task, for it simply determines that whatever it shall think about must at least be set on the way to somethingas it must be if reason is to be able to think of it practically. As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the notion of law. Human reason as basis of the goodness and badness of things is faulty, since humans are not perfect. 1-2, q. In fact, it refers primarily to the end which is not limited to moral value. 1 is wrong. A sign that intentionality or directedness is the first condition for conformity to practical reason is the expression of imputation: He acted on purpose, intentionally.. Purpose in view, then, is a real aspect of the dynamic reality of practical reason, and a necessary condition of reasons being practical. Purma (18521873), 7: bk. It follows that the first principle of practical reason, is one founded on the intelligibility of goodthat is: Because good has the intelligibility of end, and evil has the intelligibility of contrary to end, it follows that reason naturally grasps as goodsin consequence, as things-to-be-pursued by work, and their opposites as evils and thing-to-be-avoidedall the objects of mans natural inclinations. All other knowledge of anything adds to this elementary appreciation of the definiteness involved in its very objectivity, for any further knowledge is a step toward giving some intelligible character to this definiteness, i.e., toward defining things and knowing them in their wholeness and their concrete interrelations. But no such threat, whether coming from God or society or nature, is prescriptive unless one applies to it the precept that horrible consequences should be avoided. cit. The goodness of God is the absolutely ultimate final cause, just as the power of God is the absolutely ultimate efficient cause. [10] In other texts he considers conclusions drawn from these principles also to be precepts of natural lawe.g., S.T. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. Hence he denies that it is a habit, although he grants that it can be possessed habitually, for one has these principles even when he is not thinking of them. It is necessary for the active principle to be oriented toward that something or other, whatever it is, if it is going to be brought about. 94, a. Thus the principles of the law of nature cannot be. 91, a. It is important, however, to see the precise manner in which the principle, Good is to be done and pursued, still rules practical reason when it goes astray. In its role as active principle the mind must think in terms of what can be an object of tendency. 2). Thus in experience we have a basis upon which reason can form patterns of action that will further or frustrate the inclinations we feel. The first article raises the issue: Whether natural law is a habit. Aquinas holds that natural law consists of precepts of reason, which are analogous to propositions of theoretical knowledge. For example, both subject and predicate of the proposition, But in this discussion I have been using the word intelligibility (, It is not merely the meaning with which a word is used, for someone may use a word, such as rust, and use it correctly, without understanding all that is included in its intelligibility. The end is the first principle in matters of action; reason orders to the end; therefore, reason is the principle of action. One reason is our tendency to reject pleasure as a moral good. But Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man; he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. [33] Hence the principles of natural law, in their expression of ends, transcend moral good and evil as the end transcends means and obstacles. Similarly, from the truth of the premises and the validity of the reasoning we can say that the conclusion ought to be true. [47] Hence evil in the first principle of natural law denotes only the actions which definitely disagree with nature, the doing of which is forbidden, and good denotes only the actions whose omission definitely disagrees with nature, the doing of which is commanded. However, Aquinas does not present natural law as if it were an object known or to be known; rather, he considers the precepts of practical reason themselves to be natural law. Aquinas mentions this point in at least two places. The results are often . Posthumous Character: He died 14 years before the Fall of Jurassic World. [58] S.T. From Catechism of the Catholic Church (1789) Some rules apply in every case: - One may never do evil so that good may result from it; - the Golden Rule: "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them."56 - charity always proceeds by way of respect for one's neighbor and his conscience: S.T. 1) Since I propose to show that the common interpretation is unsound, it will be necessary to explicate the text in which Aquinas states the first principle. at II.8.4. [57] In libros ethicorum ad Nichomachum, lib. 1, ad 9. [54] For the notion of judgment forming choice see ibid. Of course, we can be conditioned to enjoy perverse forms of indulgence, but we could not be conditioned if we did not have, not only at the beginning but also as an underlying constant throughout the entire learning process, an inclination toward pleasure. The Latin verb translated as "do" is the verb "facere," which can also be . Thus actions are considered good or bad only by virtue of extrinsic consequences. 3, d. 33, q. Therefore this is the primary precept of law: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. 6. A few people laughed, a few people cried. Aquinas assumes no a priori forms of practical reason. Utilitarianism is an inadequate ethical theory partly because it overly restricts natural inclination, for it assumes that mans sole determinate inclination is in regard to pleasure and pain. [56], The good which is the subject matter of practical reason is an objective possibility, and it could be contemplated. [49] It follows that practical judgments made in evil action nevertheless fall under the scope of the first principle of the natural law, and the word good in this principle must refer somehow to deceptive and inadequate human goods as well as to adequate and genuine ones. Hence it belongs to the very intelligibility of precept that it direct to an end. The principle is formed because the intellect, assuming the office of active principle, accepts the requirements of that role, and demands of itself that in directing action it must really direct. [60] A law is an expression of reason just as truly as a statement is, but a statement is an expression of reason asserting, whereas a law is an expression of reason prescribing. Thus we see that final causality underlies Aquinass conception of what law is. But something is called self-evident in two senses: in one way, objectively; in the other way, relative to us. of the natural law precepts, although he does not accept it as an account of natural law, which he considers to require an act of the divine will.) Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of practical reason. And from the unique properties of the material and the peculiar engineering requirements we can deduce that titanium ought to be useful in the construction of supersonic aircraft. cit. "Ethics can be defined as a complete and coherent system of convictions, values and ideas that provides a grid within which some sort of actions can be classified as evil, and so to be avoided, while other sort of actions can be classified as good, and so to be tolerated or even pursued" Rather, Aquinas proceeds on the supposition that meanings derive from things known and that experienced things themselves contain a certain degree of intelligible necessity.[14]. Aquinass understanding of the first principle of practical reason avoids the dilemma of these contrary positions. 2, and applies in rejecting the position that natural law is a habit in q. It directs that good is to be done and pursued, and it allows no alternative within the field of action. The first principle of the natural law is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided" (q94, a2, p. 47). The rule of action binds; therefore, reason binds. Suarez offers a number of formulations of the first principle of the natural law. The basic principle is not related to the others as a premise, an efficient cause, but as a form which differentiates itself in its application to the different matters directed by practical reason. In defining law, Aquinas first asks whether law is something belonging to reason. Just as the principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness which is the first condition of the objectivity of things and the consistency which is the first condition of theoretical reasons conformity to reality, so the first principle of practical reason expresses the imposition of tendency, which is the first condition of reasons objectification of itself, and directedness or intentionality, which is the first condition for conformity to mind on the part of works and ends. [34] Summa contra gentiles 3: chs. In other texts he considers conclusions drawn from these principles also to be precepts of natural lawe.g., S.T. Verse Concepts. The good which is the end is the principle of moral value, and at least in some respects this principle transcends its consequence, just as being in a certain respect is a principle (of beings) that transcends even the most fundamental category of beings. Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Maritain suggests that natural law does not itself fall within the category of knowledge; he tries to give it a status independent of knowledge so that it can be the object of gradual discovery. pp. But in this discussion I have been using the word intelligibility (ratio) which Aquinas uses both in this paragraph and later in the response. at II.7.5: Honestum est faciendum, pravum vitandum.) Here too Suarez suggests that this principle is just one among many first principles; he juxtaposes it with Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. 2, ad 2. His theory of causality does not preclude an intrinsic relationship between acts and ends. 1-2, q. Together these principles open to man all the fields in which he can act; rational direction insures that action will be fruitful and that life will be as productive and satisfying as possible. [5] That law pertains to reason is a matter of definition for Aquinas; law is an ordinance of reason, according to the famous definition of q. Just as the principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness which is the first condition of the objectivity of things and the consistency which is the first condition of theoretical reasons conformity to reality, so the first principle of practical reason expresses the imposition of tendency, which is the first condition of reasons objectification of itself, and directedness or intentionality, which is the first condition for conformity to mind on the part of works and ends. cit. 7) First, there is in man an inclination based on the aspect of his nature which he has in common with all substancesthat is, that everything tends according to its own nature to preserve its own being. b. Desires are to be fulfilled, and pain is to be avoided. He thinks that this is the guiding principle for all our decision making. Every judgment of practical reason proceeds from naturally known principles.[48] The derivative is from the underived, the underivable principles. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. In fact, Aquinas does not mention inclinations in connection with the derived precepts, which are the ones Maritain wants to explain. "Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." -St. Thomas Aquinas Every man acts for an end insofar as his intellect understands it to be good. The primary precepts of practical reason, he says, concern the things-to-be-done that practical reason naturally grasps as human goods, and the things-to-be-avoided that are opposed to those goods. Aquinas thinks of law as a set of principles of practical reason related to actions themselves just as the principles of theoretical reason are related to conclusions. Aquinass position is not: we conclude that certain kinds of acts should be done because they would satisfy our inclinations or fulfill divine commands. Who believed that the following statement is built into every human being: "Good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided." 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